Two studies examined the heuristic and systematic processing of accuracy-versus impression-motivated individuals expecting a discussion with a partner believed to hold either a favorable or unfavorable opinion on the discussion issue. Given the goal of having a pleasant interaction, impressionmotivated (versus accuracy-motivated) participants in both studies were particularly likely to express attitudes that were evaluatively consistent with the partner's opinion, reflecting their selective use of a "go along to get along" heuristic. Study 2 yielded stronger evidence for the distinct nature of heuristic and systematic processing in the service of accuracy versus impression goals. In this study, the evaluative implication of impression-motivated participants' low-effort application of a "go along to get along" heuristic biased their more effortful, systematic processing, leading to attitudes consistent with the partner's views. In contrast, given the goal of determining an accurate issue opinion, accuracy-motivated participants exhibited relatively evenhanded systematic processing, resulting in attitudes unbiased by the partner's opinion. The results underscore the utility of a dual-process approach to understanding motivated cognition.
Intuition and experience suggest that various motives can influence the way in which people process information and the judgments that result. That is, the motivated perceiver's cognitive processes will be a direct reflection of the goals that they are intended to satisfy. Using the heuristic-systematic model (Chaiken, 1980 (Chaiken, , 1987 Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989 ) as a theoretical framework, the present research aims to elucidate the distinct ways in which accuracy versus impression motives are served by both heuristic and systematic processes.
The Heuristic-Systematic Model
The heuristic-systematic model proposes a dual-process framework in which people may process information in a relatively effortless heuristic mode and in a more cognitively demanding, systematic mode. Whereas heuristic processing is characterized by the application of simple decision rules (e.g., Serena Chen, David Shechter, and Shelly Chaiken, Department of Psychology, New York University.
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Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Serena Chen or Shelly Chaiken, Department of Psychology, New York University, 6 Washington Place, Seventh Floor, New York, New York 10003. Electronic mail may be sent via the Internet to serena@xp.psych.nyu.edu. "consensus opinions are correct"), systematic processing is marked by a more comprehensive analysis of judgment-relevant information. To illustrate, a consumer deciding whether to buy a certain automobile may simply rely on the fact that many others have bought the same car-that is, apply the heuristic that consensus opinion suggests a good judgment. Alternatively, she may process more extensively, for example, by inquiring about the car's mileage and safety features. Although heuristic and systematic processing may occur alone, they may also co-occur in particular ways (Chaiken et al., 1989) . For example, the evaluative implication of a heuristic cue may bias the nature of systematic processing (Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994) . To illustrate, favorable consensus cue information may lead our consumer to interpret ambiguous information about the automobile more favorably, because the consensus cue establishes the expectation of encountering positive information about the car.
Processing predictions follow the model's sufficiency principle, which contends that the nature of processing reflects a trade-off between minimizing cognitive effort while maximizing judgmental confidence (Chaiken, 1987; Chaiken et al., 1989; Maheswaran & Chaiken, 1991) . Thus, low levels of motivation are associated with either or both heuristic and minimal systematic processing, as such low-effort processing generally satisfies judgmental confidence concerns under such conditions. When motivation is higher, confidence demands are increased, eliciting greater systematic processing in the effort to reach these heightened levels of desired confidence.
Accuracy Versus Impression Motivation
The present research focuses on accuracy-and impressionmotivated heuristic and systematic processing. Early research on the heuristic-systematic and allied models assumed that processing is often guided by accuracy motives (e.g., Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1979) . The accuracy goal ofdetermin-ing objectively valid judgments has roots in the "knowledge" (Katz, 1960) and "object appraisal" (M. B. Smith, Bruner, & White, 1956 ) functions of attitudes and, more recently, in the validity concerns associated with issue involvement (Chaiken &Stangor, 1987) .
Beyond accuracy, the heuristic-systematic model encompasses defense and impression motives (Chaiken, GinerSorolla, & Chen, 1996; Chaiken et al., 1989; Chaiken, Wood, & Eagly, in press) . Whereas the former refers to the desire to hold attitudes and beliefs that are congruent with existing self-definitional beliefs, impression motivation refers to the desire to determine attitudes that will satisfy current social goals. Thus, impression motives elicit a consideration of the interpersonal consequences of expressing a particular judgment in a given social context. Impression motivation is allied with the social-adjustive function of attitudes (M. B. Smith et al., 1956) 1 and, more recently, with response involvement (e.g., Leippe & Elkin, 1987) and impression-relevant involvement (Johnson & Eagly, 1989) . Theories of impression management (Schlenker, 1980; Tetlock & Manstead, 1985) and self-presentation (e.g., Jones, 1990; Tedeschi & Riess, 1981 ) similarly pertain to impression goals.
Despite the existence of conceptually analogous motives, the heuristic-systematic model is distinct in its joint consideration of multiple motives on the one hand, with multiple processing modes on the other. As with accuracy goals, impression motives may be served by heuristic processing, systematic processing, or both. Whether only one or both processing modes operate in the service of these goals, either independently or in conjunction, depends on situational factors such as the availability of heuristic cue information, motivational factors such as the importance of the judgmental task, and cognitive factors such as perceivers' current capacity .
Given the goal to determine valid judgments, accuracy-motivated heuristic and systematic processing is characterized by a relatively impartial, open-minded treatment of information.
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When motivation is low, information is scarce, or cognitive capacity is constrained, accuracy-motivated individuals may simply base their attitudes on the heuristic cue information seen as best suited for achieving their accuracy goals. On the other hand, given adequate cognitive resources and higher motivation, they may also exhibit systematic processing to serve their validity goals.
In contrast, impression-motivated processing is marked by a selective bias aimed at satisfying immediate social goals. Thus, impression-motivated heuristic processing involves the selective use of heuristics . For instance, a "moderate opinions minimize disagreement" heuristic may be applied to serve the goal of having a smooth interaction with a person of unknown views. When others' opinions are known, a "go along to get along" heuristic may instead be used to serve the same goal. On the other hand, with sufficient cognitive capacity and higher impression motivation, individuals may also process in more effortful ways. However, as with heuristic processing, impression-motivated systematic processing is selectively biased toward achieving current social goals . For example, an interviewee who desires to be well liked and to appear forceful may process information on an issue so as to be prepared to counterargue views in opposition to those of the interviewer.
Whereas ample evidence exists for accuracy-motivated heuristic and systematic processing (e.g., Chaiken, 1980; Maheswaran, Mackie, & Chaiken, 1992; Petty & Cacioppo, 1979 , 1984 ; for reviews, see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Olson & Zanna, 1993) , research on impression-motivated processing is more limited. Nonetheless, research on accountability offers some pertinent evidence (for a review, see Tetlock, 1992; Tetlock, Skitka, & Boettger, 1989) . For example, in one study participants who were aware of the views of the person to whom they were accountable merely used a low-effort "acceptability" heuristic to serve their impression-motivated concerns with accountability-that is, they expressed attitudes that agreed with the other's views. 3 On the other hand, impression-motivated systematic processing was observed among participants who were unaware of the other's views-these individuals engaged in relatively more integratively complex processing, resulting in the moderate attitudes they chose to express (Tetlock, 1983) .
Research examining the processing of issue-involved versus response-involved individuals is also relevant (Leippe & Elkin, 1987) . In this study, issue involvement can be construed as a form of accuracy motivation, 4 and response involvement as a 1 M. B. Smith et al.'s (1956) social-adjustive function can be used to refer to attitudes that are strategically expressed to achieve current social goals or to those expressed to affirm one's valued group identities (see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993) . Impression motivation is closely tied to the former, whereas concern with valued group identities is more conceptually tied to defense motivation.
2 Although the goal of accuracy-motivated individuals, by definition, is to seek the truth, this does not imply that their processing is necessarily unbiased. Cognitive factors, such as bias in one's knowledge base, may color the evaluative nature of processing. For instance, a person's greater knowledge of arguments on one side of an issue may result in stronger counterarguing against information supporting the other side of the issue (for further discussion of knowledge-based biases in information processing, see Biek, Wood, & Chaiken, 1996) . 3 Tetlock's social contingency model (Tetlock, 1992; Tetlock et al., 1989) proposes that accountability concerns reflect desires to protect and enhance social and self-images, as well as the desire for power and resources. According to the model, accountability leads to one or more of the following strategies: (a) use of the low-effort acceptability heuristic; (b) multidimensional, flexible processing aimed at preemptive selfcriticism; and (c) defensive bolstering of existing opinions. The accountability strategy that people exhibit depends on whether the views of an anticipated audience are known and on the attitudinal constraints of past commitments. Given that accountability implicates social image concerns, accountability can be seen as an impression motivation manipulation in cases in which the audience's views are either known or unknown and past attitudinal commitments are minimal. When past commitments are strong, accountability is likely to elicit defense-motivated processes. 4 As Chaiken and Stangor (1987) argued, whether issue involvement instigates objective or biased processing depends on other factors such as prior commitments or vested interests in the issue. Johnson and Eagly (1989) similarly recognized the variable motivational orientation of issue-involved individuals by drawing the important distinction between outcome-relevant involvement (relevance of issue to desirable goals or outcomes) and value-relevant involvement (relevance of issue to enduring values). Leippe and Elkin's (1987) issue involvement manipulation is properly viewed as an outcome-relevant form of involve-form of impression motivation. Given their accuracy concerns, high issue (and low response) involvement participants' attitudes and systematic processing were responsive to objective differences in the quality of the arguments presented about the issue. In contrast, given their desire to appear both flexible and well informed in an upcoming interaction with a person of unknown views, rather than being sensitive to argument quality differences, high response (and low issue) involvement participants expressed middle-of-the-road attitudes, in part a result of the evaluatively balanced way in which they processed attituderelevant information. In heuristic-systematic terms, although high involvement elicited greater processing among all participants, the nature of this processing was a direct reflection of the goals it was used to serve.
The Present Research
Given the increasingly critical distinction between more and less effortful thought and behavior (e.g., Bargh, 1990; Chaiken et al., 1989; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, in press ; E. R. Smith, 1995) , research needs to examine how perceivers may satisfy different goals in both heuristic and systematic ways. In the present two studies, accuracy-and impression-motivated participants anticipated a discussion with a partner with known views on the discussion issue. We reasoned that either the accuracy goal to express valid attitudes, or the impression goal to express socially advantageous ones, could be elicited in this context. 5 After exposure to attitude-relevant information, participants' attitudes and processing were assessed.
Across both studies, we predicted that heuristic and systematic processing in the service of accuracy versus impression goals would differ. Given the goal to have a pleasant interaction, we expected impression-motivated individuals to selectively invoke a "go along to get along" heuristic, as seen in a stronger tendency to tailor their attitudes to fit their partner's views. In contrast, given the primary goal of expressing valid opinions on the issue, accuracy-motivated individuals were expected to view the partner attitude information as less goal-relevant and, hence, to be relatively less likely to base their attitudes on this heuristic cue information.
Assuming that the expectation of a discussion would elicit relatively high motivation for all participants, we anticipated motivational differences in the nature, but not amount, of systematic processing. Specifically, we expected impression-motivated systematic processing to be biased by the partner attitude ment-indeed, their issue involvement findings are in accord with the relatively objective, unbiased processing seen in the outcome-relevant studies of the Johnson and Eagly meta-analysis. Thus, in this sense, Leippe and Elkin's issue involvement can be seen as a form of accuracy motivation. However, it should be noted that although outcome-relevant involvement often engenders accuracy-motivated processing, to the extent that one's vested interests are linked to particular desired outcomes, defensive processing may emerge (Giner-Sorolla & Chaiken, 1995; Liberman & Chaiken, 1992) . Thus, in the absence of any direct assessment of participants' vested interests in the two issues used in the Leippe and Elkin study, the possibility that both accuracy and defense motives were operating cannot be entirely ruled out. heuristic cue information. That is, impression-motivated participants with favorable partners were expected to have more systematic thoughts in favor of (vs. against) the issue, whereas the reverse was expected for those anticipating partners with unfavorable views. In contrast, we expected the valenced nature of accuracy-motivated systematic processing to be less biased by the partner attitude information. Indeed, we predicted accuracy-motivated individuals to process information in a relatively evenhanded manner.
In light of past research suggesting that systematic processing is associated with attitudinal persistence (e.g., Chaiken, 1980; Chaiken & Eagly, 1983; Mackie, 1987; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) , we also assessed participants' delayed attitudes. Given our prediction that the attitudes of both accuracy-and impression-motivated individuals would be based in part on systematic processing, we expected some attitudinal persistence for all participants. Whether cognition is in the service of accuracy or impression goals, the thoughtful consideration of judgmentrelevant information that distinguishes systematic from less effortful processing suggests that the attitudes that result will have meaningful cognitive support that enhances their likelihood of enduring. Thus, contrary to the notion that opinions initially expressed in the service of impression goals are oftentimes fleeting (e.g., Cialdini & Petty, 1981) , a heuristic-systematic analysis suggests conditions under which attitudes expressed to satisfy immediate social demands may persistnamely, contexts in which they are at least in part a product of systematic forms of processing.
In Study 1, we operationalized accuracy and impression goals in terms of the self-monitoring construct (Snyder, 1974) . Given the motivational nature of the construct (Snyder, 1987) and evidence for differences in the attitudinal expression (DeBono, 1987; Snyder & DeBono, 1985) and interaction styles (Ickes & Barnes, 1977) of high versus low self-monitors, use of this individual difference seemed appropriate. High self-monitors' concerns with the social implications of their attitudes and behavior directly correspond to the impression-motivated focus on the social consequences of expressed judgments. In comparison, low self-monitors' concerns are relatively more in line with accuracy goals insofar as these individuals focus less on the situational appropriateness of opinions and more on the extent to which their actions and beliefs conform with internal values and standards (Snyder, 1987; Snyder & DeBono, 1987) .
Study 1

Overview
In the two focal conditions, high and low self-monitors anticipated a discussion with a partner who held either a favorable or unfavorable attitude toward the discussion issue. A third partner attitude condition in which participants expected a partner with unknown views was included in light of prior work suggesting that impression-motivated individuals may express moderate opinions under such conditions, presumably because such views confer considerable flexibility (e.g., Leippe & Elkin, 1987; Tetlock, 1983) . A no-discussion control group was also used. After exposure to a message arguing in favor of the issue, participants indicated their attitudes, listed their thoughts, and completed several other measures. At least 2 weeks after the laboratory session, participants were telephoned to obtain a delayed measure of their attitudes.
Method Participants
Three hundred and four students (185 female, 119 male) from New \brk University introductory psychology classes participated for course credit. Participants were selected on the basis of their scores on the 25-item Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder, 1974) , which was administered in an initial mass testing session. Those scoring in the upper and lower 40% of the distribution of scores were recruited (M = 8.65, low selfmonitors; M = 16.00, high self-monitors).
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Assessment of Initial Attitudes
Initial attitudes on the experimental issue were also assessed in the mass testing session. Participants indicated their attitudes toward reduced media coverage of hijacking events on a 15-point scale (1 = strongly disagree. 15 = strongly agree). The mean initial attitude was 7.44.
Materials
Argument quality was varied to explore potential differences in the extent to which participants would discriminate between a strongly versus weakly argued message. Two 375-word messages arguing in favor of reduced coverage were written, one with five weak arguments and one with five strong arguments. Twenty pilot participants rated the quality of each message on a 15-point scale (1 = very weak, 15 = very strong). Those exposed to the strong message rated its quality as reliably higher (M = 9.29) than those rating the weak one (M = 4.58), p < .05.
Procedure
Upon arrival for a study called "Discussions," participants were told to look for their "room assignment," which was posted on a bulletin board. In actuality, everyone was led to the same room. This procedure upheld the later contention that two experimental sessions were being run at the same time. Once all participants were seated at desks separated by dividers, the experimenter delayed the experiment by explaining that a maintenance person needed to check the outlets in the room. This delay provided a justification for the procedure later used to manipulate the partner attitude variable (see below). After 5 min, the experimenter indicated that the session would have to begin due to time constraints.
Participants were first informed that the purpose of the experiment was to examine "how people get along when they communicate their views." Each participant was told that he or she would be randomly paired with a student from the "other" session who would be his or her discussion partner. Reduced media coverage of hijacking events was introduced as the randomly chosen discussion topic. Participants were told that the discussions would be audiotaped "in order to help us analyze how you get along." Anonymity of their responses was assured. Next, participants were told that they would read an essay on the media issue, written by students in a prior study, to help familiarize themselves with the topic. Afterward, they would complete a subject information sheet used for "record-keeping" purposes and a questionnaire used to get "a feel for the ways people develop their ideas on issues." After completing both forms, partners would be introduced and given a few minutes to acquaint themselves with one another, after which the actual discussions would begin.
At this point, the experimenter indicated that it was necessary to check the other session to make sure that the two sessions were synchronized. Participants engaged in a filler task during the experimenter's absence. After 4 min, the experimenter returned and said:
We are behind schedule since we started late. To save time, we decided that we would skip those few minutes we were going to give you to get acquainted with your partners. However, in order to still let you know a little bit about your partners, we've decided to have you trade subject information sheets. I already have the sheets filled out by your partners. Now I need you all to fill these sheets out for your partners.
Each participant filled out a subject information sheet. Participants were then informed that one of the participants from the other session had not shown up. Because the other session had "one less person," someone in their session would not engage in a discussion. A lottery was conducted to decide which participant would be assigned to the control condition. This person was told that it was important to complete all measures because "your responses will still be useful to us." Participants in the other conditions received an information sheet from their alleged partners. The experimenter then left the room to deliver participants' sheets to the other session, thereby giving each experimental participant the opportunity to look at his or her partner's sheet.
On the one-page, handwritten sheet, participants were led to believe that their partner was a male senior named Steven Read. In addition to several demographic items, the sheet included a section entitled "Comments on the Experiment." For the unknown partner attitude condition, one sentence appeared in this section: "I think this is an interesting issue." For participants in the favorable partner attitude condition, the same sentence was followed by "I'm really in favor of reduced media coverage of hijacking events. In fact, on the scale, I circled a 14." For the unfavorable partner attitude condition, the first sentence was followed by "I really don't think the media should reduce its coverage of hijacking events. In fact, on the scale, I circled a 2."
The experimenter promptly returned and handed out the essays, assigning each participant to the strong or weak argument condition. After reading the essays, participants indicated their attitudes on the issue on a scale that they were told would be swapped with their partners. They 6 Practical considerations about the availability of participants dictated the 40% cutoff. Although some research suggests that the responses of those who score moderately on motivationally relevant personality dimensions may be more influenced by situational factors than by the particular trait in question (e.g., Sorrentino & Short, 1977) , such evidence has not been shown with respect to the self-monitoring construct. Moreover, extensive taxometric analyses on the scale used to assess self-monitoring strongly suggest that this construct is a class variable (see Snyder, 1987, Chapter 12) . then completed the questionnaire, which included the remaining dependent measures (see below).
Finally, participants filled out a suspicion probe. The experimenter then revealed that there would be no discussions, after which participants were partially debriefed and excused. At least 2 weeks later, participants were phoned under the guise of an opinion survey on government policies. Fourth in a list of five items was a delayed attitude measure. Participants were fully debriefed after indicating their attitudes on the issue.
Dependent Measures
Attitudes. Participants indicated their laboratory attitudes toward reduced media coverage of hijacking events on a 15-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 15 = strongly agree). Delayed attitudes were assessed on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 1 = strongly agree).
Thought listing. Immediately after indicating their laboratory attitudes, participants were given 2 min to write down any thoughts they had had pertaining to the issue, the essay, the upcoming discussion or discussion partner, or "anything else that comes to mind."
Manipulation checks. All participants rated the quality of the message (1 = very low, 15 = very high). Participants in the three partner attitude conditions guessed their partners' attitudes on the same 15-point scale used to assess their own attitudes. Although we did not believe that participants would necessarily be conscious of their goals, or that their self-reported motives would necessarily be accurate, we nonetheless included an exploratory motivation item ("To what extent were you thinking about your partner?"). To the extent that people can veridically report on their goals, we expected high self-monitors to indicate a greater interpersonal focus than low self-monitors on this 15-point awareness-of-motivation item (1 = not at all, 15 = a great deal).
Results
Nine participants were deleted because they were suspicious of either the discussion or the partner attitude manipulation. Of the remaining 295 participants, 21 were excluded because of our inability to contact them for the delayed attitude measure. The reported analyses reflect the remaining 274 participants (132 high self-monitors, 142 low self-monitors). In analyses of the major dependent measures, argument quality did not reliably interact with any other factor. To preserve the integrity of the design, this variable was nonetheless retained in all analyses. Reliable argument quality main effects are presented, but not discussed further.
Manipulation Checks
Partner attitude. Partner attitude guesses were examined using a 2 X 3 X 2 (Self-Monitoring Status X Partner Attitude X Argument Quality) analysis of variance (ANOVA), excluding control participants. Only a partner attitude effect emerged, F(2,207) = 53.39,p< .001. The guesses of participants in the favorable condition were more favorable (M = 13.68) than those of participants in the unfavorable (M = 2.52) and unknown (M = 10.69) conditions. Pairwise comparisons confirmed the differences among the three conditions (ps < .05).
Argument quality. The analysis of ratings of message quality yielded only an argument quality effect, F( 1, 258) = 166.12, p < .001. Those who received the strong message judged its quality to be reliably higher (M = 10.78) than those receiving the weak one (M = 5.96). Awareness of motivation. Although the pattern of means is consistent with the idea that high self-monitors (M = 7.19) were more focused on the social demands of the situation than low self-monitors (M = 6.70), no effects emerged from the 2 X 3 X 2 ANOVA (excluding control participants) on responses to the awareness-of-motivation item, Fs < 1. However, given our initial skepticism regarding self-report motivation items, these nonsignificant results were not entirely surprising. Indeed, we report other pertinent data below (see Thought-Listing Analyses) that support our assumption that high and low selfmonitors were differentially motivated.
Laboratory Attitudes
Unless otherwise noted, all results reported were obtained by 2X4X2 (Self-Monitoring Status X Partner Attitude X Argument Quality) analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs), using participants' initial attitudes on the issue as the covariate.
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Participants who read the strong message in favor of reduced media coverage agreed with it more (M = 9.79) than those who read the weak message (M = 7.81), F( 1, 257) = 24.81, p < .001. The partner attitude effect was also reliable, F( 3, 257) = 17.21, p < .001. Participants with favorable partners were more in favor of the issue (M = 10.68) than were those with unfavorable partners(M = 6.67), F{ 1, 257) = 59.89,/J < .001. Both of these means differed reliably from the unknown (M = 8.47) and no-discussion control condition means (M = 9.28), ps < .01, which did not differ from one another, F(l, 257) = 1.99, n s.
The predicted Self-Monitoring Status X Partner Attitude interaction was also reliable, F(3,257) = 2.64,p = .05. To further examine this interaction, planned interaction contrasts were conducted on the adjusted means shown in Table 1 . Each interaction contrast included high and low self-monitors in two of the partner attitude conditions. The focal contrast involving the two conditions in which participants were aware of their partners' views was marginally reliable, F( 1, 257) = 3.24, p = .07. As predicted, high self-monitors showed a stronger tendency to base their attitudes on a "go along to get along" heuristic-when anticipating a partner with favorable views, high (vs. low) selfmonitors expressed more favorable attitudes; when expecting an unfavorable partner, high (vs. low) self-monitors indicated more unfavorable attitudes.
Interaction contrasts comparing high and low self-monitors in each of the partner-aware conditions to their counterparts in the control group were also conducted. Given the prediction that high self-monitors would rely particularly strongly on the partner attitude heuristic cue information, it was expected that the attitudinal difference between each of the partner-aware conditions and the control condition would be larger for high than for low self-monitors. Although the contrast comparing the favorable partner attitude and control condition was not reliable (F < 2), the interaction contrast between the unfavorable and control condition was highly significant, F( 1, 257) = 9.25, p < .005. Simple comparisons within each self-monitoring group revealed that only high self-monitors' attitudes in the unfavorable condition were significantly less favorable than the attitudes expressed by their control counterparts, F(l, 257) = 27.89, p<.001.
It was hypothesized that high self-monitors in the unknown condition might choose to express moderate opinions-those presumably the most useful in ensuring a smooth exchange with others of unknown views. Although neither interaction contrast comparing each partner-aware condition with the unknown condition was reliable (Fs < 1), the contrast comparing high and low self-monitors in the unknown versus control condition was significant, F( 1, 257) = 4.23, p < .05. Consistent with a moderation interpretation, high self-monitors with partners of unknown views expressed reliably less extreme attitudes than their control counterparts, F( 1, 257) = 5.98, p < .05, a difference that was not seen among low self-monitors, F( 1,257) = .22, ns.
Thought-Listing A nalyses
Two coders, blind to experimental condition, classified each thought into one of four categories: (a) issue-related, (b) partner-related, (c) discussion-related, or (d) miscellaneous thoughts. Issue-related thoughts were further subdivided on the basis of valence and depth (see Table 2 ). Intercoder reliability was 82%, and disagreements were resolved through discussion.
Several thought indices were constructed to examine our predictions. An overall index aggregating all but miscellaneous thoughts was computed, as well as an issue index composed of only issue-related thoughts (GI+, GI-, SI+, SI-; see Table 2 ). As expected, no differences emerged on either index (Fs < 2), indicating that high and low self-monitors were comparable in the overall number of thoughts they had, and in the number of issue-related thoughts they listed.
An interpersonal index aggregating partner-and discussionrelated thoughts was computed to examine differences in the extent to which participants were focused on the social situation. Given their social goals, we expected high self-monitors to have more of these thoughts than low self-monitors. In this sense, we viewed these thoughts as a measure of impression motivation. Indeed, given its relatively indirect nature, this index may represent a more veridical assessment of motivational differences than our self-report item.
Analysis of the interpersonal index (excluding control participants) yielded only a partner attitude effect, F( 2,206) = 4.83, p < .01. Participants with unfavorable partners had more of these thoughts (M = .90) than did those in the other conditions (unknown, M = .43; favorable, M = .42), ps < .01. Although high self-monitors did not list more interpersonal thoughts overall, an analysis of only partner-related thoughts supported our prediction. High self-monitors had more thoughts about the partner (M = .48) than low self-monitors (M = .21), F( 1,206) = 3.48, p = .06. Not surprisingly, a partner attitude effect also emerged for partner-related thoughts, F( 2,206) = 5.24, p < .01, with the means reflecting those found for the overall interpersonal index.
To examine the nature of accuracy-versus impression-motivated systematic processing, a valenced index was computed by subtracting the sum of each participant's unfavorable system- "I don't think media coverage should be reduced." "I agree that too much coverage ties the hands of government officials." "It's wrong to think that reduced coverage will deter terrorism." "My partner is in favor of reduced media coverage." "I hope my partner is nice." "The discussion should be interesting." "I wonder how long the discussion will last." "I'm hungry." "The essay was well written." atic thoughts (SI-) from the sum of his or her favorable systematic thoughts (SI+). 8 Analysis of this valenced thought index yielded an argument quality effect indicating that those who read the strong message had a predominance of favorable thoughts (M = . 16) and those who read the weak one had more unfavorable thoughts (Af= -.20), F( 1,257)= 16.49,p< .001. Reliable effects for self-monitoring status, F( 1, 257) = 4.08, p < .05, and partner attitude, F(3, 257) = 3.11, p < .05, were qualified by a two-way interaction, F(3, 257) = 2.58, p = .054. The adjusted means for this interaction appear in Table 3 . Simple effects tests conducted within each self-monitoring group revealed that the partner attitude effect was only reliable for high self-monitors, F(3, 257) = 5.47, p < .01. The valenced nature of low self-monitors' systematic processing did not vary across partner attitude conditions, F{3, 257) = .43, ns.
Focusing on the partner-aware conditions, the interaction contrast testing the prediction that high (vs. low) self-monitors' systematic processing would be more biased by the partner attitude information was not significant (F < 1). However, pairwise comparisons among the four high self-monitoring means showed that the unknown condition differed reliably from the control, F( 1, 257) = 12.25, p < .001, and favorable conditions, F( 1, 257) = 9.72, p< .001. Thus, consistent with a biased processing prediction, those with favorable partners expressed reliably more favorable thoughts than at least their unknown condition counterparts.
Delayed A ttitudes
Partial correlations controlling for initial attitudes and the number of days between a participant's laboratory participation and the delayed attitude measure (M = 15.47; range = 10 to 5 5 days) were computed for each self-monitoring group. Laboratory and delayed attitudes were reliably correlated for low (pr = .43) and high self-monitors (pr = .51), indicating some attitudinal persistence for all (ps < .01). The correlations did not differ from one another, z < 1.
Discussion
Important differences were seen in the attitudes and processing of high versus low self-monitors. High self-monitors who were aware of their partners' attitudes showed a marginally stronger tendency than low self-monitors in the partner-aware conditions to "go along to get along" with their partners. Consistent with self-monitoring theory and research, high self-monitors readily adapted to the demands of the social situation by agreeing with the partner (see Snyder, 1987) . One plausible account for the finding that low self-monitors also showed a tendency, though much weaker, to agree with their partners, may lie in the fact that we told participants that the experimental purpose was to analyze how people "get along." By using such instructions, we may have inadvertently promoted some concern with impression motives for all.
In terms of processing, although direct support was somewhat weak for the prediction that the systematic processing of high self-monitors would be more biased by the partner attitude information than that of low self-monitors, high self-monitors nonetheless listed more thoughts about the partner, and furthermore, showed greater variability in their systematic processing across partner attitude conditions-that is, across changes in the social context. In contrast, low self-monitors exhibited a consistent and slight predominance of thoughts against the issue across all partner attitude conditions. In light of the fact that the message always argued in favor of the issue, low self-monitors may have pondered unfavorable arguments in the effort to be impartial.
The markedly favorable attitudes and favorable systematic processing seen among high self-monitors in the control condition require interpretation. After a control participant was designated, he or she was directly addressed by the experimenter and told that "your responses will still be useful to us." Though speculative, high self-monitors' chronic motivational concerns may have led them to construe such instructions as indicating the situational appropriateness of paying close attention to the message's favorable arguments and endorsing its favorable issue position.
In line with the notion that middle-of-the-road attitudes may be expressed to facilitate future interaction with others of unknown views (Leippe&Elkin, 1987; Tetlock, 1983; cf.Cialdini & Petty, 1981) , high self-monitors in the unknown condition expressed reliably less extreme attitudes than did their control counterparts, a difference not observed among low self-monitors. Though we acknowledge that the reliable difference seen among high self-monitors in these two conditions may be largely attributable to the highly favorable attitudes seen in the control condition, the fact remains that the attitudes of high, but not low, self-monitors were responsive to these changes in the social context. Consistent with this idea that high self-monitors in the unknown condition were responding to the upcoming social situation is the fact that even though they guessed the partner's attitude to be highly favorable (M = 12.47), these individuals chose to express favorable, but nonetheless moderate, attitudes (M=8.33).
Interestingly, despite their moderate attitudes, high self-monitors in the unknown condition exhibited highly unfavorable systematic processing. One potential explanation for this finding is that the manipulated uncertainty of the anticipated social interaction with the partner prompted these presumably impression-motivated participants to consider unfavorable arguments in preparation for the possibility of encountering a partner with unfavorable views on the issue.
In line with the observation that all participants exhibited some systematic processing, substantial attitudinal persistence was seen for both high and low self-monitors. At the very least, the comparable size of the correlations between laboratory and delayed attitudes for high and low self-monitors challenges the idea that attitudes expressed to serve impression motives are likely to be more "elastic" (e.g., Cialdini & Petty, 1981) than are those in the service of validity goals.
Although the results were largely consistent with our predictions, we designed a second study to overcome the interpretive difficulties we encountered in our first one. First, to reduce the feasibility of attributing any observed results to differences in participants' desire to accept the position of an experimenterprovided message, we presented all participants with an evaluatively balanced message. Second, we chose instructions that would be less likely to promote one motive over the other. Third, we experimentally manipulated the two motives instead of relying on the self-monitoring construct. Although we maintain that high self-monitoring and impression motivation are tightly linked, and that low self-monitors' desire for congruence between their outwardly expressed attitudes and internal standards (Snyder, 1987 ) is often linked with objectivity concerns, we acknowledge that the degree to which low self-monitors' beliefs and standards reflect accuracy motives may be less than what is necessary for a convincing demonstration of the distinct nature of accuracy-versus impression-motivated processes.
Study 2
In Study 2, we used a priming task to activate accuracy versus impression goals (see Bargh, 1990) in the context of expecting a discussion with another person. For practical reasons, we examined only the conditions in which participants were aware of their partner's views.
Given research on the judgmental impact of consensus information (e.g., Axsom, Yates, & Chaiken, 1987; Maheswaran & Chaiken, 1991) , we added a measure to assess consensus opinion beliefs. We expected that all participants may infer consensus opinion and subsequently base their attitudes at least in part on a "consensus opinions are correct" heuristic. Stated in terms of normative versus informational influence (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955) , those with impression goals may treat consensus as a normative cue, judging the inferred opinion as the one best suited to serve their immediate social goals. In contrast, accuracy-motivated individuals may view consensus as an informational cue, judging the inferred opinion as evidence about the nature of reality (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993) . Although all participants may use a consensus heuristic, we hypothesized that motivational differences may nonetheless emerge in terms of the basis on which accuracy-versus impression-motivated individuals infer consensus.
In the current context, consensus opinion could be reasonably inferred from participants' initial attitudes, their partner's attitude, or both. Given their interpersonal focus, we expected impression-motivated individuals to be particularly likely to infer consensus on the basis of their partner's attitude. This prediction fits the shared reality framework (e.g., Hardin & Higgins, 1996; Higgins, 1992) , which contends that a primary social goal when communicating with others of known views is to construct a shared reality about the topic under discussion. On the other hand, we reasoned that those with accuracy goals may be less likely to use their partners' attitude to construct a shared reality; instead, consistent with the false consensus effect (e.g., Ross, Greene, & House, 1977) , they may view their own attitudes as an objective reflection of reality.
Method Overview
After engaging in a motivation priming task, participants expected a discussion with a partner with favorable or unfavorable views on the discussion issue. After reading an essay on the issue, participants' thoughts and immediate and delayed attitudes were assessed.
Participants
Sixty-seven students (42 female, 25 male) enrolled in New York University introductory psychology classes participated for course credit.
Assessment of Initial Attitudes
In an initial mass testing session, attitudes were assessed on the issue of whether the media should broadcast the presidential election returns before all the polls close using a 9-point bipolar scale (-4 = against broadcasting, +4 = in favor of broadcasting). The mean attitude was 0.42.
Materials
Essay. Two 425-word essays were used. Unlike in Study 1, the essays were evaluatively balanced with three arguments in favor of and three against the issue. The favorable arguments appeared first in one essay version and last in the other.
Motivation priming scenarios. To prime motivation, three scenarios were written for each motive. Each two-paragraph scenario asked participants to indicate how they would respond in a particular situation. Pilot testing had indicated that the situation described in each scenario was one that would be likely to elicit a consideration of either accuracy or impression goals.
The accuracy scenarios emphasized thinking and behaving objectively. For example, one scenario asked participants to imagine being a reporter seeking to get the facts on an issue. Examples of responses consistent with accuracy goals are "I would go to the library to look up statistics" and "I would talk to experts." On the other hand, the impression scenarios emphasized the need to tailor thought and behavior to the demands of the social situation. To illustrate, one scenario asked participants to imagine being on a blind date with a close friend's cousin to whom they feel no attraction. Examples of responses consistent with impression motives are "I would make the best of it" and "I would be nice since it is good to make new friends."
Procedure
Participants signed up for a study examining "how people engage in discussions about their views on various topics." In lieu of the filler task that participants in the first study completed when the experimenter left the room to "synchronize the two sessions," participants engaged in a motivation priming task. Before leaving the room, the experimenter said I knew that there would be a short time gap here while I go check on the other session. I was wondering if you would all do me a small favor while you are waiting. I am trying to collect some pilot data for my master's thesis and was hoping you could each respond to some short "imagine-yourself-in-this-situation" scenarios. It won't take very long. I would appreciate it if you could spend just three or four minutes responding to each one.
All participants agreed to help. Each participant was randomly given either the three accuracy or three impression motivation scenarios. The experimenter then left the room to get the information sheets used to manipulate the partner attitude variable. Four minutes later, the experimenter returned while participants continued working on the scenarios. A 12-min time limit was placed on the completion of the scenarios. After collecting the scenarios, the experimenter thanked participants.
The remaining procedure paralleled that of Study 1, excluding the control and unknown conditions. To "save time," participants filled out subject information sheets and received sheets from their partners. As in Study 1, these sheets were used to manipulate the partner attitude variable. After reading one of the randomly assigned essay versions, participants indicated their attitudes and completed the remaining dependent measures. After responding to a suspicion probe, they were partially debriefed. At least 2 weeks later, participants were telephoned under the guise of an opinion survey to obtain a delayed measure of their attitudes on the media issue.
Dependent Measures
Laboratory and delayed attitudes. Participants indicated their laboratory attitudes on a 15-point scale (1 = against broadcasting, 15 = in favor of broadcasting). Delayed attitudes were assessed on a 7-point scale (1 = against broadcasting, 7 = in favor ofbroadcasting).
Thought listing. As in Study 1, participants engaged in a 2-min thought-listing task.
Consensus inferences. Consensus inferences ("What do you think is the attitude of your friends and acquaintances?") were assessed on the same scale used to assess laboratory attitudes.
Manipulation checks. Participants were asked to guess the attitudes of their partners on the same scale used to assess their own attitudes. For exploratory purposes, two self-report items were once again included to assess awareness of motivation, one for accuracy motives ("To what extent have you been thinking about the different sides of the issue?") and one. for impression motives ("To what extent have you been thinking about your discussion partner?"). Both responses were rated on scales anchored at 1 (not at all) and 15 (a great deal).
Results and Discussion
Manipulation Checks
Partner attitude. The 2X2 (Prime X Partner Attitude) ANOVA on participants' guesses of their partners' attitudes yielded only the expected partner attitude effect, F(\, 58) = 249.35, p < .001, indicating that participants correctly perceived their partner's attitudes.
Awareness of motivation. Two judges first examined each scenario to make sure that at least one response was given and that each response was consistent with the intended motivation. A participant was excluded if either criterion was not met. Interjudge reliability was 96% and disagreements were resolved through discussion. Four participants either did not complete all the scenarios or gave inconsistent responses (e.g., "I don't care if my date is my friend's cousin-Why should I be nice to someone I don't like?"). One individual was suspicious of the scenarios.
A 2 X 2 (Prime X Partner Attitude) ANOVA of the remaining 62 participants' responses to the self-report accuracy motivation item yielded an unexpected Prime X Partner Attitude interaction, F( 1, 58) = 15.34, p < .01. Whereas the means for participants with unfavorable partners were as expected (accuracy M = 8.93, impression M = 6.47), the means were reversed among those with favorable partners (accuracy M = 6.11, impression M = 9.69). On the other hand, results consistent with our priming manipulation emerged on our self-report impression motivation item (accuracy M = 7.18, impression M = 8.71), F( 1, 58) = 2.92, p = .09. Thus, despite the high selfreported accuracy motivation of impression-motivated participants with favorable partners, these same individuals also reported greater impression concerns than did their accuracymotivated counterparts. Additional evidence for the adequacy of our priming manipulation is reported below (see ThoughtListing Analyses).
Laboratory Attitudes
Because preliminary analyses showed that the essay version did not influence laboratory attitudes, all analyses were collapsed across this variable.
9 Unless otherwise noted, all subsequently reported results were obtained by 2 X 2 (Prime X Partner Attitude) ANCOVAs, using participants' initial attitudes on the issue as the covariate.
Two significant findings for laboratory attitudes emerged. Overall, participants with favorable partners expressed more favorable attitudes (M = 8.44) than did those with unfavorable partners (M = 6.30), F( 1, 57) = 5.17, p < .05. This partner attitude effect was qualified by the predicted Prime X Partner Attitude interaction, F( 1, 57) = 4.14, p < .05. The adjusted means appear in Table 4 . Impression-motivated participants appeared to "go along to get along"-those expecting a favorable partner expressed more favorable attitudes than did those who thought that their partner was against the issue, F( 1, 57) = 7.88, p = .01. In sharp contrast, the attitudes of accuracy-9 A 2 X 2 X 2 ANCOVA (Prime X Partner Attitude X Sex of Participant) on laboratory attitudes, controlling for initial attitudes, yielded several reliable effects. A significant partner attitude effect and two-way interaction between prime and partner attitude condition were qualified by a reliable three-way interaction, F{ 1, 53) = 4.41, p < .05. Simple effects tests broken down by prime and participant sex revealed that neither the attitudes of accuracy-nor impression-motivated male participants were reliably influenced by the partner attitude manipulation. Not surprisingly, the attitude data for female participants, the majority sex of the sample, were similar to the overall attitude data. A significant partner attitude effect was found among impression-motivated female participants, F( 1,53) = 10.69, p < .01, but not accuracymotivated ones, F < 1. As a result of the limited number of male participants and the ancillary relevance of these findings to the current theoretical focus, further interpretation of these findings was not pursued. motivated participants with favorable versus unfavorable partners did not differ (F < 1).
Thought-Listing Analyses
Two coders, blind to experimental condition, classified each thought into one of Table 2 's categories. Intercoder reliability was 87% and disagreements were resolved through discussion. Predictions for accuracy-and impression-motivated participants mirrored those made for Study 1 's low and high self-monitors, respectively. Once again as expected, no differences were found for either the overall index aggregating all but miscellaneous thoughts or the separate issue index (GI+, GI-, SI+, SI-), Fs < 1. Participants were comparable in the overall number of thoughts they had and in the number of issue-related thoughts they listed.
As in Study 1, an interpersonal index composed of partnerand discussion-related thoughts was constructed to examine motivational differences in the extent to which participants were focused on the social context. As expected, analysis of this index revealed that impression-motivated participants (M = 1.49) had marginally more interpersonal thoughts than accuracy-motivated individuals (M = 0.87), F(l, 57) = 2.73, p = .10.
A valenced index of systematic processing was computed as in Study 1. The analysis of this index yielded the predicted Prime X Partner Attitude interaction, F( 1,57) = 8.84, p < .01 (see Table 5 for adjusted means). Impression-motivated systematic processing was biased by the partner attitude heuristic cue information-those with favorable partners expressed a predominance of favorable thoughts, and those with unfavorable partners expressed more unfavorable thoughts, F( 1,57) = 7.77, p = .01. Importantly, this motivational bias was absent among accuracy-motivated participants whose systematic processing did not differ across the favorable (M = -0.41) and unfavorable (M -0.32) partner attitude conditions, F( 1, 57) = 2.21, ns.
Consensus Inferences
Analysis of consensus inferences yielded a marginal partner attitude effect, F{ 1, 57) = 3.65, p = .06. Consensus inferences of those with favorable partners were more favorable (M = 9.24) than were inferences made by those with unfavorable partners (M = 7.65). Of more interest are the planned compar- isons done within each motivation group. Consistent with their focus on the social implications of their attitudes, only impression-motivated participants showed reliable use of their partner's attitude as a basis on which to infer consensus, .F( 1,57) = 4.21, p = . 05.
Regression Analyses
Path analyses were conducted for each motivation group to further elucidate the distinct heuristic and systematic ways in which accuracy-versus impression-motivated individuals determined their laboratory attitudes. As depicted in Figure 1 , the predictors used in these analyses were participants' initial attitudes (IA) and partner attitude (PA). The valenced thought index (VTI) and consensus inferences (CI) were examined as potential mediators of the relationship between each of the predictors and participants' laboratory attitudes.
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Both path analyses estimated the direct paths from IA, PA, VTI, and CI to laboratory attitude (LATT) and the indirect paths from IA and PA to LATT through VTI and CI (see Baron & Kenny, 1986) . To estimate the paths from IA and PA to the proposed mediators, VTI and CI were separately regressed on IA and PA simultaneously. All other paths were estimated by regressing LATT on IA, PA, CI, and VTI simultaneously (see Cohen & Cohen, 1983) .
As seen in Figure 1 , the direct path from IA to LATT was reliable for both groups, indicating that the initial attitudes of all participants served as a significant predictor of their laboratory attitudes. IA did not predict systematic processing for either group, but did reliably predict consensus inferences for accuracy-motivated participants and marginally for impressionmotivated participants. Thus, it appears that all participants relied at least in part on their initial attitudes to determine their laboratory attitudes on the issue.
Focusing on the partner attitude variable, despite the reliable partner attitude effect obtained in the ANCOVA, the direct path from PA to LATT was not significant in either path analysis. The direct attitudinal impact of the partner attitude manipula- tion was apparently attenuated when IA, CI, and VTI were jointly considered. However, the PA-VTI and PA-CI paths reveal a striking motivational difference. Consistent with our earlier findings, the partner attitude heuristic cue information exerted a strong impact only on the systematic processing and consensus inferences of impression-motivated participants.
In terms of the VTI-LATT and CI-LATT paths, Figure 1 shows that accuracy-motivated participants' attitudes were marginally predicted by their systematic processing and reliably predicted by their consensus inferences. For impression-motivated participants, the significant VTI-LATT and CI-LATT paths reveal that the attitudinal impact of the partner attitude heuristic cue information was mediated by their systematic processing and consensus inferences.
Although initial attitudes and systematic processing predicted the attitudes of all participants, comparison of the analogous paths from the two models reveals sharp motivational differences. For those with accuracy goals, the partner attitude variable had no detectable impact. These individuals relied in part on a relatively low-effort consideration of their initial attitudes and consensus inferences and in part on effortful processing unbiased by the valence of their partner's attitude. In contrast, the partner attitude variable exerted a strong impact among those focused on the social implications of their attitudes. Heuristic processing of the partner attitude information biased impression-motivated participants' systematic processing and consensus inferences, both of which predicted the attitudes they expressed.
Delayed Attitudes
Delayed attitude data were available for 42 of the 62 participants. '' Partial correlations controlling for initial attitudes and the number of days between the laboratory session and delayed measure (M= 14.5 days, range = 12 to 21 days) were computed for each motivation group. Once again, laboratory and delayed attitudes were significantly correlated for both accuracy-motivated (pr = .56) and impression-motivated (pr = .80) participants (ps < .01). Interestingly, the correlation was reliably stronger among the latter group, z = 1.73, p < .05.
General Discussion
In two studies, accuracy-and impression-motivated individuals expecting a discussion with a partner of known views differed in their attitudes and processing. The results from Study 1 were highly suggestive, despite some interpretive ambiguities. Consistent with their presumed motives, high (vs. low) self-monitors displayed greater responsivity to changes in the social context-they thought more about their partners and showed a stronger tendency to "go along to get along" with them. The distinct nature of accuracy-versus impression-motivated heuristic and systematic processing emerged more definitively in Study 2, in which motivation was manipulated.
In Study 2, accuracy-motivated heuristic and systematic processing reflected validity goals. Accuracy-motivated heuristic processing was seen in the form of a low-effort reliance on initial attitudes (e.g., "initial opinions are a good guide") and consensus inferences (e.g., "consensus opinions are valid") to determine attitudes. On the other hand, these attitudes were also based in part on accuracy-motivated participants' more effortful, systematic processing of attitude-relevant information. Importantly, neither the heuristic nor systematic processing of these individuals was biased by the partner attitude heuristic cue information.
In sharp contrast, impression-motivated processing in both studies reflected the goal to have a pleasant interaction. The stronger tendency for impression-motivated individuals to agree with their partners serves as evidence for their selective use of a "go along to get along" heuristic. Importantly, further analyses revealed that the attitudinal impact of this heuristic was mediated in part by more effortful processing. Just as other heuristic cues in the service of other motives have been shown to bias subsequent processing (Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994) , impression-motivated participants' heuristic processing of the partner attitude information biased the evaluative nature of their systematic processing in a direction consistent with their partners' opinions.
Like those with accuracy goals, impression-motivated participants based their attitudes in part on the low-effort use of a consensus heuristic. However, the construction of this heuristic reflected their social goals. By incorporating their partners' views into their consensus inferences, impression-motivated participants appear to have engaged in the "social action" of constructing a shared reality with their partners in anticipation of interacting with them (Hardin & Higgins, 1996; Higgins, 1992) . In contrast, the reliable influence of accuracy-motivated participants' initial attitudes on their consensus inferences suggests that these individuals took "personal action."
Thus, despite somewhat weak results on the self-report motivation items, support for the predicted motivational differences nonetheless emerged, particularly in Study 2. This apparent discrepancy suggests not only that some skepticism regarding the accuracy of people's self-reported goals is warranted, but also that our participants were not in fact aware of the goals guiding their judgments and processing. Rather than viewing participants' apparent lack of awareness with apprehension, we realize in retrospect that the methodological soundness of using an ostensibly unrelated task as a priming manipulation relies in large part on the fact that our participants were not aware that the motivational primes were applicable to the experimental tasks. Had individuals been aware, contrast effects may have instead been observed (e.g., Lombardi, Higgins, & Bargh, 1987; Strack & Hannover, 1996) . n By priming accuracy versus impression goals within the same judgmental context, our research not only extends earlier work on motivated processing that has typically examined the cognitive consequences of different goals by manipulating experimental instructions or aspects of the experimental context (e.g., Leippe & Elkin, 1987; Tetlock, 1983) , but also adds to the recent literature on goal priming (for a review, see Bargh & Barndollar, 1996) . Furthermore, the present research carries the important implication that current views on the nature of the multitude of trait and goal priming effects examined in the broader social-cognitive literature may be importantly elucidated by a heuristic-systematic analysis of their underlying processes.
A Heuristic-Systematic Motivational Framework
The diverse areas in which dual-process models have been applied to predict judgments and behavior speaks to the importance of distinguishing between more and less effortful processes (e.g., Bargh, 1990; Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986 ). The present findings underscore the utility of a heuristic-systematic approach to understanding motivated cognition (Chaiken et al., 1989 . Although multiple motives have long been recognized, research delineating how goals differentially shape both heuristic and systematic forms of processing is far from common (cf. Tetlock, 1992) .
Beyond simply distinguishing more from less effortful cognition, the heuristic-systematic model suggests important ways in which heuristic and systematic processing may co-occur (Chaiken et al., 1989) . Of particular relevance is the possibility that the judgmental implications derived from heuristic processing may subsequently bias the evaluative nature of systematic processing. By documenting the biasing impact of impression-motivated participants' heuristic processing of the partner attitude information on systematic processing, the present work extends past research in which the two processing modes have been shown to co-occur in similar ways in the service of accuracy goals (Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994; Maheswaran & Chaiken, 1991) .
In terms of attitudinal persistence, our findings agree with past research suggesting that attitudes backed by systematic processing may endure (e.g., Chaiken, 1980; Chaiken & Eagly, 1983, Experiment 2; Mackie, 1987; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986 ; see also Higgins, 1992) . Although it may be limited to issues about which people lack extensive prior knowledge, the stability of impression-motivated participants' attitudes is especially noteworthy in light of the frequent characterization of such attitudes as short-lived (cf. Cialdini & Petty, 1981) . Indeed, the persistence of their attitudes was even stronger than that of accuracy-motivated participants' attitudes in Study 2.
Although we view knowledge of the heuristic versus systematic bases of attitudes as highly relevant to attitudinal persistence predictions, our only claim is that attitudes expressed on the basis of systematic processing, by definition, reflect a fairly comprehensive consideration of attitude-relevant information that may serve to foster persistence. We recognize, of course, that the extent to which an attitude endures will also depend on the chronic and future situational goals of the individual and the nature of future judgmental contexts in which attitude-relevant information is encountered. For example, when newly faced with compelling counterattitudinal arguments, chronically accuracy-motivated individuals' effortful processing of this information may well alter their attitudes, despite the systematic basis on which they were initially expressed. Finally, we acknowledge that in the absence of conditions in which systematic processing was not elicited, strong confirmation of our persistence hypotheses awaits future empirical scrutiny.
Implications for Future Research
The present work aimed to show the distinct ways in which cognition is used to serve different motives. Beyond this, future research needs to examine the influence of different goals at varying levels of motivation. Neither the level of accuracy nor impression motivation was purposely varied in the present studies, in which it was reasonably assumed that all participants were highly motivated. Whereas high and low accuracy (e.g., Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994) and defense motivation (Liberman & Chaiken, 1992) have been studied, differences in the heuristic versus systematic nature of impression-motivated processing as a function of varying levels of motivation have yet to be examined. Thus, for instance, had impression motivation been lower in the present context, the partner attitude information might have had only a direct, rather than mediated, impact on impression-motivated participants' attitudes. Indeed, future research on multiple levels of motivated cognition would also allow for better tests of persistence hypotheses.
Although participants across both studies were viewed as either accuracy-or impression-motivated, our only assumption was that they were primarily one or the other. Indeed, we recognize the possibility that in everyday settings, people may engage in hybrid patterns of processing in their efforts to address multiple motives (cf. Leippe & Elkin, 1987 ; see footnote 5 of the present article). Future efforts will need to assess the nature of heuristic and systematic processing in such ecologically meaningful contexts in which more than one goal may be operating (see Chaiken et al., 1996) .
Finally, the utility of extending the heuristic-systematic model beyond accuracy motives to the arena of interpersonal goals speaks to the value of applying the basic principles of the model beyond the attitudes domain (see also Chaiken et al., 1989) . Accuracy concerns may often be dwarfed by interpersonal motives in the nonattitude domains of person perception, stereotyping, and relationships (cf. Sedikides, 1990; Thompson, Roman, Moskowitz, Chaiken, & Bargh, 1994) . If this intuition is correct, the present research represents one step toward understanding the more and less effortful cognitive pathways by which social goals determine our impressions and judgments of others, and possibly in turn our feelings and actions toward them.
